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I. INTRODUCTION
“The actions by thousands of people . . . are in danger of making the law
look an ass,” said John Whittingdale, chairman of the United Kingdom’s
Commons culture committee.1 What exactly could inspire such a frank
statement? Social network sites like Facebook and Twitter.2 To understand
why requires a look back to events during the summer of 2011, when a
British soccer player, referred to in official records as “CTB,”3 sued News
Group Newspapers (NGN) and former Big Brother contestant, Imogen
Thomas (Thomas), in British courts. His goal was to prevent the defendants
from running a story regarding an alleged affair with Thomas.4 The claimant
received an injunction but the information was released through a social
network site, quickly rendering the injunction largely ineffective.5 Prior to
the injunction, Thomas arranged several meetings with CTB at which she
demanded a number of concessions.
At first she requested 50,000 pounds sterling, which CTB refused to pay.
At a subsequent meeting she demanded game tickets, which CTB did
provide.6 He claimed that he accepted Thomas’s meetings for fear that she
would sell her story otherwise.7 CTB then contacted Thomas to demand that
she cease all contact with him, further offering to pay the previously
requested sum. However, Thomas increased the sum to 100,000 pounds
sterling and warned CTB that journalists were near her home.8 Thomas
contacted CTB one last time to say that a paper was ready to publish the
story along with photos taken of them at the arranged meetings, though she
denied knowing how these were obtained.9 At this point, CTB filed for the
injunction, which Justice Eady ultimately granted,10 noting, among other
1
Hélène Mulholland, Ryan Giggs Named as Footballer at the Centre of Privacy Row, THE
GUARDIAN (May 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/23/ryan-giggsnamed-footballer-injunction-row.
2
Id.
3
CTB is a moniker the court used to refer to the claimant in order to protect his identity
when court documents are released to the public. For other examples of this practice see ETK
v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWCA (Civ) 439 and MNB v. News Grp.
Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 528 (Eng.).
4
CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232, [1]–[2].
5
Tweets About Super-Injunction Footballer Spike After Attempts to Gag Twitter, TELEGRAPH
(May 22, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8528823/Tweets-about-super-in
junction-footballer-spike-after-attempts-to-gag-Twitter.html [hereinafter Tweets Spike].
6
CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 at [5]–[6].
7
Id. at [5].
8
Id. at [8].
9
Id. at [10].
10
See id. at [1], [16] (explaining that Justice Eady granted a temporary injunction on April
14, which he later continued).
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things, evidence strongly suggested Thomas was blackmailing CTB after
cooperating with NGN to engineer photographic proof of an affair.11
At this juncture, CTB’s information should have been secure. Yet, by
early May, the social network site Twitter was alight with posts about the
CTB case and other super-injunctions.12 One user posted a list of individuals
believed to be the anonymous claimants, prompting CTB to begin
proceedings against the social networking site in order to identify violators.13
Though Twitter cooperated, the online community’s response was explosive;
an estimated twelve thousand Twitter users posted CTB’s identity and
involvement within twenty-four hours of the disclosure request.14 His
identity thus thoroughly exposed, Ryan Giggs agreed to relinquish the
anonymity designation by late February of 2012.15 In this instance, Twitter
became a vehicle by which individuals bypassed a legally binding, though
unpopular, court order designed to protect the privacy of a U.K. citizen and
forced private information into the public domain.
Amidst these
circumstances and the atmosphere of upheaval, Chairman Whittingdale
voiced his strongly worded concerns about the effect social networking sites
will have on the application and enforcement of privacy laws in the U.K.16
How can regulators protect the privacy rights of citizens in the face of userdriven media like Twitter? The answer to that question is rather murky.
Some argue that social network sites are the cause of similar online
privacy problems and, in circumstances where individuals have not
voluntarily posted information, they should have the enforceable right to
demand its removal from the internet.17 Others argue there is no practical
way to regulate social network sites.18 Whether a comprehensive means of
adequately regulating social network sites exists is beyond the scope of this
11

Id. at [7], [11].
Footballer’s Twitter Disclosure Order Prompts Online Action, BBC NEWS UK (May 21,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13482403.
13
Id.
14
Tweets Spike, supra note 5.
15
Ryan Giggs Finally Gives Up Anonymity Over Imogen Thomas ‘Affair,’ TELEGRAPH
(Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/9095826/Ryan-Giggs-finally-givesup-anonymity-over-Imogen-Thomas-affair.html.
16
See Mulholland, supra note 1.
17
Terence J. Lau, Towards Zero Net Presence, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
237, 271 (2011) (explaining the concept of “Zero Net Presence,” which would give
individuals who find personal information online that they did not voluntarily submit the right
to demand and have that information completely removed from the site).
18
See generally James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2009)
(listing types of regulations that have not been effective resolutions for online privacy
infringement and suggesting a combination of individual tort liability, reliable privacy
settings, and user education).
12
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Note. Rather, this Note suggests that the advent of social network sites has
disrupted the balance of human rights as embodied in the U.K. (and similar
legal systems) by making it easier for the news media and other individuals
to force otherwise private information into the public eye. Dealing
specifically with the context of celebrities, this Note reexamines the
protections that the U.K.’s privacy law provides and suggests that the current
regime should be strengthened in favor of individual rights to privacy rather
than to the media’s right to free expression.
Part II describes the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and
the Human Rights Act of 1998 (HRA), which are the two primary sources
used to balance privacy rights and freedom of the press in the U.K., and
which consequently serve as the legal bases for the injunction at issue.19 Part
III includes a summary of Justice Eady’s holding on Giggs’s injunction and
additional details regarding the subsequent circumvention of that injunction,
which better illustrate the British interpretation of privacy law under the
European Convention. This information also highlights the opposing views
of the British courts and the public regarding privacy injunctions. Part IV
briefly summarizes historic problems with social network sites generally,
thus providing a frame through which to understand how social network sites
influence the viability of proposed privacy solutions. Part V concludes with
an analysis of the most likely source of the U.K.’s privacy woes regarding
super-injunctions and points to a potential solution in the form of altered
media regulations.
II. PRIVACY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The U.K.’s privacy laws are strongly influenced by the ECHR,20 to which
the nation is a party.21 Because of this influence, any understanding of
privacy law in the U.K. first requires an understanding of the relevant parts
of the ECHR. Furthermore, certain aspects of the U.K.’s application of
ECHR provisions have resulted in public disquiet and political division that
may be relevant to a meaningful analysis of the Giggs injunction debacle

19
See generally CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 (Eng.)
(analyzing the case under Convention articles as permitted by the Human Rights Act).
20
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, open for
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR], available at http://www.echr.
coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/E NG_CONV.pdf.
21
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/Tr
eaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CM=8&CL=ENG (last updated May 10, 2012)
(listing various states and their relation to the ECHR and its parts).
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because they signal a sense of longstanding public disquiet regarding judicial
application of the privacy law.22
A. The European Convention on Human Rights
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.”23 These words, drafted into the ECHR, indicate the
individual’s right to be protected from intrusion into his or her private life.
Article 10(1) embodies an equally powerful protection for freedom of
expression,24 a right including “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas.”25 This does not expressly grant media
services freedom of the press because the statutory language is couched in
terms of individuals; however, Article 10(1) is the provision most often used
to protect media defendants if defamation or similar reputational claims
brought in ECHR member states reach the European Court of Human Rights
(Strasbourg Court).26 Both articles serve to protect important rights, but both
have built-in restrictions on their applications.
Article 10(2) limits the scope of freedom of expression by providing that:
The exercise of these freedoms . . . may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.27

22

See discussion infra Part II.B.
ECHR, supra note 20, art. 8, para. 1.
24
CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232, [32] (Eng.) (quoting the
Council of Europe as saying: “These rights are neither absolute nor in any hierarchical order,
since they are of equal value.”).
25
ECHR, supra note 20, art. 10, para. 1.
26
Régis Bismuth, Standards of Conduct for Journalists Under Europe’s First Amendment,
8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 283, 285–86 (2010). For those having trouble with the alleged
distinction between the rights of expression and the press, consider ECHR art. 10, para. 1,
which uses the term “everyone” to define its scope within a convention on human rights, but
does not clearly establish a right for press agencies. See supra note 20. In its most literal
interpretation, a free press right appears to have less to do with an individual human right than
with the right of a media agency to conduct itself in a particular manner.
27
ECHR, supra note 20, art. 10, para. 2 (emphasis added).
23
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When analyzing cases under this paragraph the Strasbourg Court looks to
three factors: (1) whether the interference with expression has been
prescribed by law, (2) whether the interference serves one of the legitimate
aims listed in the paragraph, and (3) whether the interference is necessary to
a democratic society.28 According to Article 10(2), the right to reputation,
which is protected by Article 8(1) of the ECHR, is a legitimate aim sufficient
to limit the freedom of the press or expression in general.29 However, this
does not mean that any matter considered private under Article 8 can be
blocked from media reports via injunction.
On the contrary, Article 8(2) has its own exceptions that largely mirror
the language found in Article 10(2).30 The most relevant portions read,
“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right [to privacy] except such as . . . is necessary in a democratic
society . . . or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”31 The
language of this article appears to form the basis of a public interest
exception to individual privacy whereby the media and others could obtain a
right to comment on another’s private matter if it falls within the scope of
“information debated in a democratic society.”32
What constitutes the “public interest” has come to include political,
social, and foreign issues; health and science breakthroughs; and information
related to private corporations and their executives.33 The Strasbourg
Court’s reasoning behind this exception has been the media’s role as a
societal “watchdog,” a concept shared with the United States.34
The relationship that appears to emerge from Articles 8 and 10 is one of
balance between the right to privacy and the right to free expression; the first
right appears to be balanced by the public interest exception, while the
second appears to be balanced by a private interest exception. This
interpretation is supported by a judicially forged balancing test created to
weigh an individual’s right to privacy against the presumptively superior
interests of a democratic public in free expression and the press.35 As is
28

Bismuth, supra note 26, at 288–89.
See ECHR, supra note 20, art. 10, para. 2.
30
Compare id. art. 8, para. 2, with id. art. 10, para. 2.
31
Id. art. 8, para. 2.
32
Bismuth, supra note 26, at 291.
33
Id. at 292.
34
Id. at 290–91; Kyu Ho Youm, Liberalizing British Defamation Law: A Case of Importing
the First Amendment?, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 415, 445 (2008) (noting consistency between
U.K. case holdings in support of the watchdog function and the U.S. First Amendment).
35
Bismuth, supra note 26, at 290 (observing that the “weighted balancing test” appears to
lend freedom of expression a favorable presumption rebuttable by a sufficiently narrow
private exception).
29
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explained below, a key element of this balance is the nature of disseminated
information. In the old Anglo-American system, factual or true information
could serve as an absolute defense when the plaintiff’s concern was
reputational harm.36 However, Strasbourg jurisprudence demonstrates that
when the issue involves an alleged breach of the plaintiff’s privacy, the
determinative factor is not truth, but whether the information is
“newsworthy” in the sense that it is beneficial to societal debate.37
The Strasbourg Court took steps to clarify this difference in Von
Hannover v. Germany, a case in which a member of Monaco’s royal family
sued to keep pictures of her private life out of the news media.38 The court
noted the need to distinguish “between reporting facts—even controversial
ones—capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society relating to
politicians in the exercise of their functions . . . and reporting details of the
private life of an individual who . . . does not exercise official functions.”39
In the latter situation, information is considered purely private (not
newsworthy) and outside the protection of Article 10 free expression; in the
former situation the media would be fulfilling its democratic duty by
reporting information that affects the function of democratic society
(newsworthy).40 The court continued to highlight the distinction by giving
an example of ordinarily private information with clear implications for
societal functioning: the release of medical information regarding a head of
state.41
In summary, newsworthiness appears to be the factor capable of
activating the public interest defense to a breach of privacy. Proving
newsworthiness grants a media defendant the protections of Article 10,
otherwise the plaintiff’s Article 8 right to privacy controls. Key to
determining whether information is newsworthy is whether it involves a
public figure acting within the scope of his duties for the state or facts that
otherwise impact the proper functioning of the state.
B. Human Rights Act 1998: The U.K. Bill of Rights
Initially, membership in the ECHR meant that British citizens could bring
charges against the government before the Strasbourg Court for trial in an
36

Youm, supra note 34, at 421–22.
Bismuth, supra note 26, at 293.
38
Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 8–9, available at http://www.
echr.coe.int.
39
Id. para. 63.
40
See id. (“[I]n the former case the press exercises its vital role of ‘watchdog’ in a
democracy . . . .”).
41
Bismuth, supra note 26, at 294 (referring to a case cited by the court in Von Hannover).
37
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international, rather than domestic, forum.42 Part of the U.K.’s response to
this lack of control over human rights cases was to create the HRA,
sometimes colloquially referred to as the U.K.’s bill of rights.43 The HRA
incorporates the ECHR into U.K. law by codifying, among others, Articles 8
and 10.44 In doing so, British courts seized control of local human rights
cases by permitting citizens to bring any claims based on ECHR rights in
domestic courts, thus removing the necessity of bringing domestic British
claims to Strasbourg.45 Though the Strasbourg court continues to function as
primary interpreter, introduction of the HRA enabled British courts to
assume some degree of interpretive power regarding the grievances arising in
the U.K.
The HRA does more than protect privacy and free expression vis-à-vis
ECHR language. Certain sections have been interpreted to expand judicial
power by granting courts broad oversight on legislative matters regarding the
adopted human rights.46 For example, Section 4 of the HRA gives U.K.
courts the additional power to issue declarations of incompatibility, which
instruct Parliament that a law does not satisfy ECHR standards and should be
changed to do so.47 Though the declarations are not binding on legislators or
case parties,48 the power to broadly interpret ECHR compatibility and then
advise legislators seems to have been a substantial shift in judicial power.
This infusion of power into British courts partially abrogated parliamentary

42

Joanne Sweeny, The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act: Using Its Past to Predict Its
Future, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 39, 42 (2010) (“Originally, the ECHR was intended as a
vehicle where nations could bring grievances against each other, but it was later expanded to
allow individual citizens to sue their own countries before the European Court of Human
Rights . . . .”). See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A.) (1976),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int (holding the British government did not breach
individual’s Article 10 rights by preventing further dissemination of obscene books to
schools).
43
Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.) [hereinafter HRA], available at http://www.legisla
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42; Sweeny, supra note 42, at 40.
44
HRA, supra note 43, § 1(1)(a) (adopting European Convention on Human Rights
Articles 2–12).
45
See Brief for Professors of Int’l Law, Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S.
660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 497763, at *25 (saying the HRA is “the legal basis for
domestic enforcement of the Convention”); Sweeny, supra note 42, at 42–43 (noting that
incorporation of ECHR allows British citizens to bring ECHR rights cases against their own
government before domestic courts).
46
See Sweeny, supra note 42, at 43–44 (analyzing language in § 3 of the HRA that
suggests courts can “creatively interpret statutes” based on a broad possibility standard that
only prohibits judges from making impossible interpretations rather than unreasonable ones).
47
HRA, supra note 43, § 4.
48
Id. § 4(6).
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and executive power,49 at least in the human rights context, and raised fears
of a judicial end-run on Parliament.50 The fear that judges could use their
increased power to effectively seize control of the legislative process is one
explanation for why the HRA has had staunch opponents since its adoption,
particularly in the Conservative Party and tabloid media.51 With the
foundational legal principles established, a detailed analysis of CTB v. News
Group Newspapers Ltd., and additional facts surrounding the breach of
privacy by Twitter users is warranted.
III. BRITAIN’S ENERGIZER INJUNCTION
The injunction request and Twitter activity recounted in the introduction
to this Note spawned a series of cases between the parties. The following
three cases52 involving Giggs will help explicate the U.K.’s privacy law, and
are conveniently bound to the factual basis of this Note.
A. The Grant of Injunction
In the first case, which is the original injunction proceeding referenced in
the introduction, Justice Eady turned to the HRA and the balancing test to
weigh the competing rights of privacy and free expression found in the
ECHR.53 The court relied on a two stage test: first determine if the subject
matter of the injunction “give[s] rise to a ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy,’ ” and then, if there is a reasonable expectation, proceed to weigh
“countervailing considerations” against that Article 8 right to privacy.54 The
specific countervailing considerations were the Article 10 rights of Thomas,

49

There is some question whether the HRA 1998 tips the proverbial legal scales or whether
it in fact balances the division of power among the branches of government. According to
Sweeny, supra note 42, at 45, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty typically requires
judicial deference to legislative interpretations by Parliament. Yet, the executive exerts strong
control over Parliament due to the U.K.’s party structure. Therefore, “the judiciary essentially
defers to the Government.” Id.
50
CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232, [20], [2011] All E.R.
(D) 142 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (noting concern that judiciary might bypass parliament and create new
set of privacy laws); see also Dan Milmo, Campbell Verdict Allays Fears of Backdoor Privacy
Law, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2002), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2002/oct/14/pressand
publishing.privacy1.
51
Sweeny, supra note 42, at 63, 74–75.
52
See generally CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232; CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd.,
[2011] EWHC (QB) 1326 (Eng.); CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB)
1334 (Eng.).
53
CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 at [19].
54
Id. at [23]–[24].
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NGN, and the general public interest of citizens in receiving information.55
Justice Eady reiterated that an essential part of the Article 10 consideration is
whether publication would contribute to public debate as described in Von
Hannover v. Germany and similar cases.56
Justice Eady applied the two-prong test succinctly. First, because the
subject matter involved intimate and sexual behavior and was not conducted
publicly, it appeared clear under both U.K. and Strasbourg jurisprudence that
Giggs had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the relationship.57
In short, the Justice Eady concluded that the Giggs was entitled to expect
Article 8(1) protection.58 Next, Justice Eady noted precedent regarding the
court’s need “to take into account and have regard to the interests of the
claimant’s family members, and their rights under Article 8 . . . .”59 Since
Giggs was married with children, the interests of his family and their own
privacy were added to Giggs’s privacy side of the balancing equation; this
addition strengthened his claim.60 Finally, Justice Eady reasoned that the
likelihood that Giggs was being blackmailed, itself an illegal action,
engendered support for his preliminary request for anonymity as a matter of
public policy and to discourage criminal activity.61
The court then turned to the question of whether the public interest
exception of ECHR Article 8(2) should override Giggs’s right to expect the
subject matter to remain private.62 Justice Eady held that the free speech
rights of neither NGN nor Thomas could control regarding any subject
matter not then in the public domain, a factor that became more important as
the injunction later unraveled.63 The court described the subject matter as a
“kiss and tell” case, and noted the improbability that it could be considered a
matter of public interest under the ECHR, especially since the defendants did
not attempt to raise a public interest defense.64 This characterization of the
case follows the trend of both Strasbourg and U.K. precedent, which referred
to similar subject matter as “tittle-tattle” or “tawdry allegations” not entitled

55

Id. at [24].
Id. at [25]; see also Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 63,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
57
CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 at [23].
58
Id.
59
Id. at [3].
60
Id.
61
Id. at [22].
62
Id. at [23]–[24].
63
Id. at [27], [37].
64
Id. at [26] (“As in so many ‘kiss and tell’ cases, it seems to me that the answer, at stage
two, is not far to seek. Indeed, it was not even argued that publication would serve the public
interest.”).
56
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to the public interest exception and Article 10 protections “afforded to more
serious journalism.”65
To put the decision in other terms, the affair, although interesting to the
public, is not in the public interest. It is not newsworthy within the definition
of Strasbourg jurisprudence and so should not be reported to the extent that
such reporting would trample upon the privacy of its subjects against their
will.66
Before moving to the public reaction, one must note that the decision in
the Giggs case, although often called a super-injunction, is in actuality a
traditional injunction. A super-injunction essentially bars all mention of the
injunction proceedings and its related subject matter.67 Contrary to that
definition, Justice Eady commented that the decision to uphold Giggs’s right
to privacy did not eliminate Thomas’s right to free expression or prohibit her
sale of the story in any way that did not “intrude upon the privacy rights of
others.”68 Since Thomas retained some right to discuss the subject matter of
the injunction, the equitable relief that Giggs obtained should not rightly be
called a super-injunction. Further, a narrow interpretation of this decision
means that Thomas and the news media were prohibited from exposing
Giggs’s identity.69 A broad interpretation of the decision is that anonymity
injunctions like the one in CTB v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. do not
destroy an individual’s Article 10 rights to freedom of expression or the
press. Instead, such cases merely abridge those rights to the extent necessary
to protect another’s, equally important and legally proven, right to privacy
under the rule and exceptions of ECHR Article 8. Considering the broad
interpretation, the furor following this decision should perhaps come as a bit
of a surprise.
B. The Twitter Breach: The Aftermath of CTB
Ultimately, readers already know what happened following the decision:
citizens of the U.K., outraged by the new gag order, identified CTB as soccer
player Ryan Giggs and exposed this information using Twitter.70
65

Id. at [33].
See Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 63, available at http://
www.echr.coe.int (noting the distinction to be drawn between newsworthy and nonnewsworthy subject matter).
67
Thomas Sanchez, London, Libel Capital No Longer?: The Draft Defamation Act 2011
and the Future of Libel Tourism, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 469, 518–19 (2011).
68
CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 at [13] (“Claimant was fully entitled to the protection of
anonymity . . . .”).
69
Id. at [38].
70
See discussion supra Part I.
66
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Understanding the reasons for the public’s negative response is important to
the remaining cases as well as later analysis.
The news media refers to the injunction granted as a “super-injunction” or
“gag order,” a hotly debated form of injunction that prohibits the press or any
individual from referring to any information regarding the injunction,
including mention of its existence or any related details.71 The injunction
granted by Justice Eady was not in fact a super-injunction because it did not
require absolute silence on all related matters; however, the term is now
commonly used to refer to most injunctions brought by celebrities in the
U.K.72 Because super-injunctions are so controversial the cases may be
burdened by the negative connotation of an inaccurate classification.73
The CTB decision came on the tail end of a series of similar privacy
injunctions that were brought primarily by the well-to-do. The list of
applicants included an oil trading company,74 journalist,75 former bank chief
executive,76 and several professional athletes.77 As appears typical in these
situations, newspapers declared that a new gag order was in effect and rushed
to reveal as much information as possible shortly after Justice Eady granted
the injunction.78 The nature of these news reports may not have always been
innocent or intended to conform to the spirit of the injunction. Evidence
presented in the first appeal to the CTB injunction strongly suggested that
71

See Sanchez, supra note 67; see also Timeline of Events Leading to Naming of Ryan Giggs
as Footballer at Centre of Privacy Injunction Row, TELEGRAPH (May 24, 2011), http://www.tele
graph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8531560/Timeline-of-events-leading-to-naming-of-Ryan-Giggs-a
s-footballer-at-centre-of-privacy-injunction-row.html [hereinafter Timeline] (noting publication
of year-long review of super-injunctions, as well as concerns voiced in Parliament by MPs and
the Prime Minister, quoted as calling the privacy rulings “unsustainable” and “unfair”).
72
Sanchez, supra note 67, at 519.
73
See Timeline, supra note 71 (noting controversy surrounding super-injunctions generally).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.; see also Robert Winnett, Sir Fred Goodwin ‘Acted Like He Was Off to Play Golf’ as
RBS Collapsed, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/b
nksandfinance/8736315/Sir-Fred-Goodwin-acted-like-he-was-off-to-play-golf-as-RBS-collapse
d.html (identifying Sir Fred Goodwin as former chief executive of the Royal Bank of Scotland).
77
See, e.g., Martin Evans, Journalist Could Be Jailed over Twitter Comments About
Injunctions, TELEGRAPH (May 23, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/853007
6/Journalist-could-be-jailed-over-Twitter-comments-about-injunctions.html (referring to two
separate situations involving soccer players).
78
See, e.g., Imogen Thomas Vents Fury over Super-Injection Allegations, TELEGRAPH (May
16, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8517075/Imogen-Thomas-vents-fury-o
ver-super-injunction-allegations.html; Tom Wells & Nick Parker, All that Prem Ace Gave Me
was Handbag and Gag: Imogen Thomas rubbishes Blackmail Claim, SUN (May 18, 2011),
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3586202/Gagged-Imogen-Thomas-denies-blackm
ailing-former-footballer-lover-saying-all-she-got-from-him-was-a-250-handbag.html; see also
MNB v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 528, [8] (Eng.).
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certain elements of the news media promoted “jigsaw identification”79 by
regularly providing the public with hints about super-injunction claimants or
blatantly revealing identities when asked.80
At any rate, certain individuals on Twitter were able to surmise that CTB
was in fact Giggs, and when he attempted to protect his privacy against those
individuals, the online community retaliated with a wholesale exposure of his
identity.81 At that point virtually anyone who wanted access to Giggs’s
identity could have discovered it with relative ease. The fact that Giggs’s
identity appeared to be in the public domain became the prime argument in
NGN’s appeal for a variance to the injunction.82
Indeed some language in the original opinion seemed to suggest that
information in the public domain was fair game for the news media.83
Despite this language, Justice Eady, while presiding over the second case,
rejected the variance on the grounds that NGN misunderstood the purpose
behind privacy related anonymity and the passage of information into the
public domain.84 Drawing a distinction between commercial secrets (like a
secret recipe) and Article 8 rights, he explained that the truth or falsity of
information is often irrelevant because the law of individual privacy is not as
concerned with guarding secrets as it is with guarding against intrusions.85
So despite ease of online availability, a privacy injunction continues to serve
a purpose so long as some intrusion is prevented; “each exposure of personal
information . . . whether by way of visual images or verbally, . . . is a new
intrusion and occasion for distress or embarrassment.”86
In summary, the court’s analyses of cases before and after the Twitter
breach suggest a distinction between social network sites and traditional
news media. By characterizing each as a separate type of information
medium the court marks them as separate sources of intrusion that can be
limited independent of one another.87 Therefore, under the intrusion79

MNB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 528 at [27] (defining jigsaw identification as “correctly
identifying someone as a result of relating separate snippets of information”).
80
CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1326, [8] (Eng.).
81
See Tweets Spike, supra note 5.
82
CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1326 at [2].
83
CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232, [27] (Eng.) (explaining
that “the court will not attempt to prevent publication or discussion of material that is
genuinely in the public domain since, where that is so, there will no longer be any
confidentiality or privacy to protect”).
84
CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1326 at [18]–[23] (distinguishing cases put forward in support
of NGN’s position as well as the nature of privacy rights under ECHR).
85
Id. at [23].
86
Id. at [24].
87
See id. (noting that the release of Giggs’s identity on social media was a separate
intrusion and not sufficient to release the news media from the injunction).
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blocking purpose of privacy law as explained by Justice Eady, release of
information into one medium does not necessarily constitute entry into the
public domain sufficient to allow other mediums to report the protected
information.
Justice Eady also distinguished CTB from Mosley v. News Group
Newspapers Ltd., in which the court refused to grant an injunction for
information already in the public domain.88 He did so on the ground that
Giggs’s identity became known only after the injunction was already granted
and took the stance that “[d]ifferent policy considerations come into play
when the court is invited to abandon the protection it has given a litigant on
the basis of widespread attempts to render it ineffective.”89 This implies that
a higher standard applies when the court revokes an existing injunction than
when it denies an initial grant of injunction in accordance with Mosley. One
might believe Justice Eady fairly settled the matter, but that assumption
would be wrong.
C. Aftermath of the Second Decision
Mere minutes after the judicial decision to uphold anonymity, Mr.
Hemming, a Member of Parliament (MP), echoed the sentiments of NGN
when he used parliamentary privilege to formally reveal CTB’s identity
during session.90 “With about 75,000 people having named Ryan Giggs on
Twitter,” he said, “it’s obviously impractical to imprison them all.”91 NGN
quickly petitioned again to remove the anonymity order on the basis of the
MP’s statement; but again, the court denied any variance.92 Justice
Tugendhat reiterated many of Justice Eady’s points from the prior appeal and
expounded on his reasoning:
The fact that a question has been asked in Parliament seems to
me to increase . . . the strength of his case that he and his
family need that protection. The order has not protected the
claimant and his family from taunting on the internet. It is still
effective to protect them from taunting and other intrusion and
harassment in the print media.93

88
89
90
91
92
93

Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2008] EWHC (QB) 687, [36] (Eng.).
CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1326 at [18]–[19].
Mulholland, supra note 1.
Id.
CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1334 (Eng.).
Id. at [3].
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This tenacious support of the injunction, which some could consider
ridiculous in light of the facts, is best summarized by recognizing that as
unsustainable as the injunction may seem, “the law is the law and the judges
must interpret what the law is.”94 In other words, until legislative change
alters the rules that judges must follow, the court must interpret the law in
accordance with existing standards and policy regardless of the veracity of
public opposition. In this situation, that appears to mean support for the
preservation of privacy rights.
Nevertheless, the practical effect of the Twitter disclosure was to reveal
Giggs’s identity and erode the value of the injunction then in place. Ryan
Giggs’s name and photo appeared frequently in the news media despite the
court’s defense of his position.95 The initial question some may ask is: what
can be done to reduce or eliminate the use of social network sites in ways
that breach court orders? Though some might consider ways in which
regulators might crack down on social network sites, such regulation is not
likely to solve the privacy issue at play. This is due as much to the facts of
the cases just addressed as it is to the nature of social network sites. In order
to help explain this, the next section is a brief discussion of social network
sites and privacy issues related to them.
IV. SOCIAL NETWORK SITES
Social network sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, are an increasingly
popular form of interactive online media.96 Unlike other forms of electronic
media, which function primarily as communication mediums, social network
sites bear a distinctly relational element that seems to encourage their
proliferation.97 In addition, an increasing level of interconnection exists
between the different social network sites.98 These sites are used with
increasing frequency in diverse areas including consumer data tracking,99
94
Gordon Rayner, Ryan Giggs Named as Premier League Footballer in Gagging Order
Row, TELEGRAPH (May 23, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8531175/
Ryan-Giggs-named-as-Premier-League-footballer-in-gagging-order-row.html (quoting British
Prime Minister David Cameron).
95
E.g., Mulholland, supra note 1.
96
See #numbers, TWITTER BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011, 11:38 AM), http://blog.twitter.com/2011/0
3/numbers.html (noting that in February 2011, the average number of new Twitter accounts
per day was 460,000).
97
Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1154.
98
See Brian Kane, Balancing Anonymity, Popularity, & Micro-Celebrity: The Crossroads
of Social Networking & Privacy, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 327, 329–30 (2010) (noting ability
to link Facebook and Twitter accounts).
99
See Lau, supra note 17, at 243 (referring to Facebook Beacon, which tracked and shared
a user’s online purchases).
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marketing,100 and political campaigning.101 In the legal sphere they are
sometimes used for marketing services or even as evidence, and may bear
legal implications in privacy, intellectual property, and criminal matters.102
A counterpoint to the beneficial features that keep users logged in is the
difficulty of setting adequate regulations for user protection.103
Social network sites may be defined as “web-based services that allow
individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded
system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection,
and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others
within the system.”104 Websites usually take one of two basic forms for
facilitating these connections: symmetrical or asymmetrical.105 In the
former, users become contacts only by mutual assent—such as friend
requests on Facebook—while users of the latter may add a contact without
being added or accepted by that person—such as “following” someone on
Twitter.106 This basic description is a helpful guide for understanding social
network site functionality but hardly scratches the surface of the medium’s
capabilities or application.
Each social network site can offer a dizzying array of features, many of
which appear similar; yet not every social network offers the same level of
functionality. For example, Facebook allows users to catalogue a wealth of
personal data including name, birthday, contact information, political views,
educational and employment history, relational status, sexual preference, and
favorite movies and books.107 It can also be used to manage events and store
photos.108 Twitter, on the other hand, is of more limited applicability. It
only allows users to post whatever they can fit in a 140-character limit.109
Though it still permits the use of photos, video, and other media, Twitter
focuses less on the individual and more on the content of their posts (called

100

Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1183.
Lau, supra note 17, at 246.
102
See generally Sharon Nelson et al., The Legal Implications of Social Networking, 22
REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (2009–2010) (providing broad overview of problems stemming from
social networking sites).
103
Kane, supra note 98, at 344–45.
104
Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1142.
105
Id. at 1143.
106
Id.; see Adding Friends & Friend Requests, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, http://www.facebo
ok.com/help/friends/requests (last visited Dec. 10, 2012) (explaining friend requests); What is
Following, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/14019-what-is-following
(last visited Dec. 10, 2012) (describing “following” as subscribing to another user’s posts).
107
Grimmelman, supra note 18, at 1149.
108
Id. at 1149, 1151.
109
About Twitter, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
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“Tweets”).110 Of course the trouble with writing about technology is that it is
constantly changing, and the limit of what is possible is always growing;
social networks are no less prone to this trend.
A social network today is not necessarily what it was last year, last
month, or yesterday.111 Even the number of users can grow at a staggering
rate.112 Social networks are accessible from any number of portable
electronic devices such as smartphones, iPods, iPads, other tablet devices,
and computers via Internet browser or dedicated application.113
Consequently, they can be accessed virtually anywhere or by anyone with
the proper tools.114 As is explained below, social network sites not only have
a growing level of connectivity with other forms of technology, but also with
each other and various other forms of online media.
Most major news sites prominently display links to several popular social
network sites in the sidebars of their reports, encouraging readers to share the
story with their contacts.115 Twitter is able to link with Facebook directly,
thus increasing the ease with which information can spread across
networks.116 For example, a post that once would only have been distributed
to a user’s Twitter network can now simultaneously appear on Facebook
where it is available to the contacts in that user’s network, who may or may
not be the same as the user’s Twitter contacts. Keep in mind that each
contact has the ability to repost or forward most information from virtually
anywhere, thus spreading the information to their own unique network of
contacts.117 Technology permits information to spread exponentially over
social network sites.118 However, the power to quickly disseminate
110

Id.
See Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1145 (“Facebook’s pace of innovation is so
blisteringly fast that it’s not uncommon to log into the site and see that part of the interface
has changed overnight to offer a new feature.”).
112
See #numbers, supra note 96 (listing growth statistics).
113
Elise Moreau, Social Networking on Mobile Devices Increased by 37% Since Last Year,
ABOUT.COM WEB TRENDS (Oct. 21, 2011), http://webtrends.about.com/b/2011/10/21/social-ne
tworking-mobile-devices.htm; see also Kane, supra note 98, at 346.
114
See, e.g., Nelson et al., supra note 102, at 4, 9–10 (listing instances when social
networking sites were used by jurors, lawyers, or judges during court proceedings).
115
See, e.g., Henry Fountain, Expert Says Quakes in England May Be Tied to Gas
Extraction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2011, at A12.
116
How to Use Twitter with Facebook, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter.com/ar
ticles/31113-how-to-use-twitter-with-facebook (last visited Oct. 21, 2011); see also Kane,
supra note 98, at 330 (describing integration of social networks).
117
See, e.g., How to Retweet: A Simple Guide, BLOGGING BITS (Apr. 17, 2008), http://blogg
ingbits.com/the-art-and-science-of-retweeting-for-twitteraholics/ (explaining how to repost
and spread content on Twitter).
118
See Kane, supra note 98, at 346 (describing ease with which technology allows
information to be endlessly forwarded).
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information is accompanied by the risk of loss or breach of private
information.
A. Privacy Concerns
A study of the literature reveals two general types of privacy problems:
those caused by the conduct of service providers and those caused by the
conduct of users.119
1. Provider Created Problems
Provider related privacy issues arise because social network sites are
relational tools, and to facilitate these relationships, users grant the websites
access to certain personal information.120 Increased accessibility may have
unintended consequences, such as the loss of employment opportunities that
result when employers find information that users did not intend to be
public.121 This sort of loss may occur because social network sites
sometimes appear to provide more security and online isolation than they in
fact do.122 In this context, the revelation of private material may not be
intentional, but it does result from the choice of social network providers to
assume a certain site structure.
Often the information users share has market value for the service
provider and can be used directly by them.123 For example, Facebook’s
privacy policy says that user data helps to improve the overall service
provided.124 Targeted advertisement is considered part of this improvement
and is achieved by sharing user data with advertisers or collecting more data
about user habits from other online affiliates of the social network site.125
Furthermore, social network site providers are notorious for suddenly
changing privacy policy terms, as well as featured privacy tools or

119

See generally Grimmelmann, supra note 18.
See id. at 1154 (explaining how social networking sites are used for relationship
building).
121
See id. at 1166 (discussing how employers can gain access to Facebook); Kane, supra
note 98, at 341 (“[A] quick search following an employee calling in sick may lead to the
discovery of posted information leading to that employee’s termination.”).
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Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1162, 1169.
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Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises
of User-Generated Information Flows, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 741,
762–63 (2008).
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Data Use Policy: Information We Receive and How It Is Used, FACEBOOK, http://www.
facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info#howweuse (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
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settings.126 These changes may ultimately benefit the users’ privacy
concerns but often occur so suddenly that they create gaps in privacy armor;
users either do not realize there is a need to adjust their settings or struggle to
readjust in light of a now unfamiliar user interface.127 For those most
concerned with provider-generated privacy issues, the sense of disquiet boils
down to a conviction that so much personal information concentrated in the
hands of providers raises a bevy of potential data usage abuses.128 The other
class of privacy issues causing concern involves situations arising directly
between two or more users.129
2. Peer-to-Peer Problems
According to Professor James Grimmelmann, there is another, more
destructive, class of privacy issues centered on the concept of “peer-to-peer”
privacy violations, a theory of violation under which the social network site
takes a neutral role and is considered less an active violator than a catalyst
through which users perpetrate privacy violations upon one another.130
Professor Grimmelmann points out six forms of peer-to-peer violation:
“disclosure, surveillance, instability, disagreement, spillovers, and
denigration.”131 This section focuses on the last three.
“Disagreement” refers to the implied dispute regarding the type of content
different users consider acceptable for online viewing and may relate to the
social image a user wishes to portray.132 Grimmelmann uses the example of
photo tagging and untagging on Facebook.133 The user who initially “tags” a
photo creates a clear link between that image and the tagee’s profile; they do
so because of a belief that the photo’s content is acceptable material to
display. However, if the tagee subsequently chooses to untag the photo and
remove that link it may be because they have a different concept of what is
acceptable for online publication.134 Even if unintentional, the tagging
process affords users an opportunity to reveal information the tagee did not
want displayed.
126

Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1169.
See id. at 1169–70 (giving examples of how changes can affect online relationships and
interaction).
128
Id. at 1187.
129
See id. at 1187–88 (describing how peer-to-peer violations will occur regardless of
safeguards social network sites use).
130
Id. at 1164.
131
Id.
132
See id. at 1171–74.
133
Id. at 1171.
134
Id. at 1171–72.
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The “spillovers” category is linked to the implicit network structure of
social network sites, through which users seek out and accept contacts.135
Professor Grimmelmann identifies two problems that arise during the process
of acquiring contacts. First, by incorporating others into their network, users
open themselves up to aggregation studies wherein researchers can glean
highly accurate information about nationality, sexual orientation, or other
traits (even hidden ones) simply by observing the predominate traits of a
user’s contacts.136 Second, users are more willing to accept mere
acquaintances as contacts, thereby opening themselves to individuals they
would not normally give implicit trust and “who are less likely to understand
or respect [their] individual privacy preferences.”137
“Denigration” emerges in more traditional cases of defamation and refers
to situations in which one user takes action that inaccurately characterizes or
misappropriates the other’s online identity.138 The person harmed need not
be a user, nor must the information necessarily be false.139 This problem is
particularly detrimental because the nature of social networks leads users to
ascribe a higher level of credibility to posts and profile content while
simultaneously precipitating the spread of such content, thus making it easier
to cause reputational harm whether the information spread is false or true.140
The common thread among these violations appears to be that individuals
are able to compromise the privacy (actual or perceived) of themselves, other
users, and even non-users. Understanding even these few categories of
privacy infringement shows that participating in an online social network can
be a high-risk endeavor regardless of the source of the privacy infringement.
But if privacy is so threatened, why use social networks at all?
B. The Benefits of Social Network Sites
If social networks are such a risk, why are they so popular? Is it as
Facebook creator Mark Zuckerberg suggested: do people care less about
privacy in the online era?141 If that is the case, then perhaps the U.K.’s best
135

See id. at 1174.
See id. (referring to study in which researchers predicted user ages and nationalities
based on their contacts).
137
See id. at 1175.
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Id. at 1176.
139
See id. (noting one case where user created a false account using the claimant’s name and
filled it with false information, and referring back to photo tagging); see also Lau, supra note
17, at 253.
140
Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1176–77.
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Connie Davis Powell, “You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get Over It!” Would Warren
and Brandeis Argue for Privacy for Social Networking?, 31 PACE L. REV. 146, 163 (2011).
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solution is to ignore the matter and let the few disgruntled individuals
(celebrity or otherwise) deal with the fallout; perhaps loss of privacy is the
price paid for technological advancement. Zuckerberg may be correct on
some level, but his statement oversimplifies matters. On one hand, people
have personal concerns for socialization that motivate them to use social
network sites despite reputational risk.142 On the other, social networks
provide an expeditious structure for dealing with matters of public
concern.143 These sites are not only a method of satisfying human needs for
social contact, they are also efficient and trendy tools for handling
democratically important situations.
Social interaction is of particular importance to human beings.144 Social
network sites help satisfy human needs by providing opportunities to
construct personal identity, develop and strengthen individual relationships,
and foster a sense of community.145 Thus, Professor Grimmelmann posits
that the human desire for sociality is so entrenched that the offer of a social
experience effects the evaluation of privacy risks.146 Furthermore, social
network sites present a structure that may give false impressions of privacy
and intimacy that encourage users to expose themselves more than they
would otherwise.147 Beyond these private motivations however, there are
several public benefits.
Social network sites may be used to advance matters of public interest by
providing new avenues for political campaigns, humanitarian awareness and
aid, and dissemination of newsworthy information.148 This last function may
be the most important public function of social network sites because it
essentially means that traditional forms of media cease to be the only or even
the most effective methods of disseminating news.149 By both permitting the
142

Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1151.
See Zarsky, supra note 123, at 742 (noting the speed of data transfer in a network
structure). See, e.g., Lau, supra note 17, at 246 (“Politicians use Twitter to communicate their
thoughts directly to constituents.”).
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Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1159 (citing Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs to
demonstrate theoretical importance of sociality).
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Id. at 1152–57.
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Id. at 1151.
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Id. at 1160, 1162.
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See Zarsky, supra note 123, at 768–69 (noting that social networks are powerful tools for
distributing broadcast media content); see, e.g., Hope140, TWITTER HOPE140, http://hope140.
org/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2011) (providing visitors with links to donate to several
humanitarian causes and organizations); Jolie O’Dell, Twitter Starts Running Political Ads for
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redistribution of media content and facilitating non-media generated public
discourse, social network sites serve as a sort of check valve that channels
the collective voice of societies for social and even governmental change.150
Perhaps the most sweeping example of the check valve function is the
phenomenon known as the “Arab Spring” in which social media was largely
credited with facilitating protests and social outcries that toppled
dictatorships.151 This extremely brief overview of social network structure,
privacy concerns, and beneficial uses is meant to create a frame through
which to check the strength or weakness of regulating social network sites as
a method of resolving the U.K.’s privacy injunction problems.
V. REMEDYING THE NETWORK INDUCED PRIVACY BREACH
Several possible solutions to social network privacy issues exist: direct
regulation, self-regulation, and social management.152 But none of these is
adequate to solve the U.K.’s injunction breach issues. As will be explained
below, neither the external nor internal regulation of social network sites
seems likely to alleviate the privacy-infringing behavior that followed in the
wake of the CTB injunction. To understand why merely requires a look back
to the prior discussion regarding the nature and types of social network
privacy infringement.
A. Why Social Network Regulation Fails
Whether regulating social network sites is of any benefit is partially
dependent on the category of infringement (provider-based or peer-to-peer)
into which the Giggs debacle falls. The factual pattern falls into the peer-topeer category because Twitter did not breach the privacy injunction directly,
serving instead as the platform by which individual users chose to ignore the
injunction and post information about Giggs’s identity. Indeed, Twitter
cooperated with authorities to identify infringing users.153 Furthermore,
150

See id. at 768 (discussing social network sites as tool for generating public discourse).
Raymond Schillinger, Social Media and the Arab Spring: What Have We Learned?,
HUFFPOST WORLD BLOG (Sept. 20, 2011 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raymon dschillinger/arab-spring-social-media_b_970165.html (noting credit given to social media for
fomenting change as well as sentiment that social media shifted the “balance of power from
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Giggs did not post private information online and later expect it to remain so;
rather, he conducted an affair in private and took steps to keep it private.154
Twitter users discovered information that Giggs and the U.K. court deemed
private and divulged it to the online community, thus placing culpability on
network site users rather than providers.
Keeping the culpable actors in mind, turn now to the first possible
solution: direct regulation of social network sites. European democracies
tend to put a high value on protection of private, user-generated information,
and many have already implemented national or transnational regimes for
monitoring and enforcing online privacy protection.155 Britain could attempt
to strengthen its own Data Protection Act156 and force sites like Twitter to
better police themselves. However, we need not look too far down this path
because it is an exercise in futility. Under the current facts it appears that
Twitter is not directly infringing Giggs’s privacy; the ability for users to
infringe on one another’s private information is an unintended consequence
of the social network structure. If users are the problem then current data
protection regulation is not primed to address the problem as most data
protection regulation is designed to protect individuals from governmental or
private sector infringement.157 Further it is irrational to expect network
providers to accurately anticipate privacy breaches of this nature when, under
Professor Grimmelmann’s disagreement category of peer-to-peer harms,
even users are not always able to discern what will or will not be considered
private.158 Twitter is a medium for third-party communication and lacks ex
ante control over the content posted by its users, despite recent innovations
that appear to signal the contrary. In early 2012, Twitter introduced a microcensorship system designed to withhold posts in countries that find
designated content unacceptable.159 Upon notice to Twitter, any material
deemed unfit under the laws of a specific county will be censored and a
message stating, “This Tweet from @Username has been withheld in:
Country,” will replace the content of that post for all users within the
154
See generally CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 (Eng.)
(noting Justice Eady’s assertion that presented facts demonstrate no grounds for finding that
relationship was conducted publicly).
155
See Eric Caprioli et al., The Right to Digital Privacy: A European Survey, 3 RUTGERS J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 211, 213–14, 216 (Mirella Andee trans., 2006) (listing data protection regimes).
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See generally Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislatio
n.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29.
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26, 2012, 7:52 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/twitter-announces-mirco-censo
rship-policy/?ref-business.

210

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:187

designated country.160 At first glance this suggests a technical solution to
online privacy issues. For example, the U.K. need only inform Twitter that
content related to the CTB injunction cannot legally be posted and Twitter
will withhold related content. Still there are several aspects of the censorship
system and privacy that suggest this is not yet a viable solution, though it
may be a step in the right direction. First, this system is not specifically
designed with privacy in mind, rather it encompasses broader concerns a
country might have with posted content that is critical of government or
quoted text from banned literature.161 Adapting the process for enjoined
private information may be somewhat difficult to balance with the rights of
free expression. In a post of 140 characters or less, the limiting terms needed
to cover the restricted circumstance may have to be so broad that they also
prohibit innocent comments about the individuals, which may also have the
unfortunate effect of confirming or revealing information by negative
implication.
Second, the system does not appear to eliminate preexisting or new posts
that do not conform to a country’s legal requirements; Twitter describes the
system as “reactively withhold[ing] access to certain content in a particular
country.”162 This suggests that the material is not deleted but automatically
masked from users in the countries that prohibit its dissemination.163 Further
supporting this interpretation is the technical bypass that allows a user whose
country is ostensibly misidentified to “correct” Twitter by changing their
individual settings to those of another country.164 The apparent result is that
content previously identified as withheld from their account becomes
visible.165
For now, the best social network sites can do is correct breaches as they
are made known, which Twitter attempted to do by cooperating with Giggs
and authorities.166 The fact remains that even if they use micro-censorship,
social network providers are not clairvoyant. To identify protected
information and attempt to stop any online breach via their site would require
governments to make social network sites aware of the content of every
160
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injunction so that the site could create an adequate automated censor. That
measure may not be acceptable to injunction claimants and more importantly
may create more potential privacy leaks. Social networks can neither
determine the various ways in which privacy rights may be infringed nor the
content that individuals will consider private.
Another concern is that too much direct regulation could have a chilling
effect on social network sites sufficient to destroy them altogether.167 This
could be a very negative outcome because of the many beneficial uses social
network sites permit, chief of which is the growing social and political
check-valve function credited with facilitating sweeping regime changes in
the Middle East.168 Direct regulation also has the potential to exacerbate the
privacy problem since users have a tendency to retaliate when regulations bar
them from doing what they want.169 As noted earlier, Twitter users displayed
just such a negative reaction when Giggs began taking legal action against
their peers, leading to greater privacy exposure.170 Ultimately, direct
regulation does not seem to address the heart of the CTB privacy breach and
may cause more trouble than is worthwhile.
The next possible solution would, in a sense, ignore the problem. Selfregulation is a method by which the British government would permit social
network sites, as an industry, to determine their own standards for privacy
and rely on market forces to sort out the level of privacy infringement users
are willing to deal with.171 This too appears to be an inadequate solution.
First, many users do not consider the privacy breach following Giggs’s
injunction to be a privacy infringement at all, as evidenced by their
reactions.172 Thus, it seems that many users believe the true infringement is
against the right of free expression and Giggs has no right to suppress the
information. Thus, if a self-regulatory scheme relies on users to let providers
know what level of privacy is acceptable, then it is possible that privacy
infringements like the one experienced by Giggs will go unaddressed by the
industry. There simply would not be enough user complaints.
Second, even assuming user outcry was sufficient to galvanize action by
site providers, society cannot ensure that the privacy policies and technical
settings generated by a self-regulatory scheme would be able to address the
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particularized form of privacy harm suggested by cases like Giggs’s.
Policies and settings are designed to make users aware of how their
information is used and to give them greater control of what information is
disseminated on a site once that information is posted. But these measures
rely heavily on one of two scenarios: the information was posted by (1) the
user who is the subject of that information or (2) a user who is in the
subject’s network. Either case should provide the network links necessary
for user settings to limit the dissemination of information. However, neither
instance is representative of Giggs’s case. He did not voluntarily post
information regarding the affair to Twitter nor was he networked to those
users who did, at least not in any way that would provide warning or permit
him to advantageously use network settings. In the end it is as Professor
Grimmelmann posits: the problem is with users.173
What are legislators to do about such user infringement? As Mr.
Hemming noted, it would be an impossible task to imprison all the
responsible Twitter users.174 It is certainly possible to pursue individuals for
monetary damages like members of the music industry pursued individuals
for copyright violations stemming from file sharing.175 However, that does
little to help regulators prevent violations, which is arguably what individuals
seeking privacy injunctions want most. Unlike copyright, whose criteria for
identifying violations makes it predictable, privacy varies because of
individual preferences and a lack of preexisting criteria identifying what
information is private.176
One of Professor Grimmelmann’s final suggestions is that users be
educated on their privacy-affecting behaviors.177 He suggests drawing on
culturally and socially relevant norms to reach those groups at risk of
perpetrating and falling victim to privacy infringement.178 While this is not a
legal argument per se, it may present the best option in Giggs’s case, at least
in the sense that it points the analysis back to Parliament’s best legal options.
What the professor’s argument suggests is that regulation of social network
sites is inadequate to limit privacy risks because the user element continues
to contribute to those risks independent of the social network site’s actions.
173
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Sites are but the medium for the users’ messages. Thus, the broader
implication to be drawn is that where management of the social network
service fails, management of the inputs or sources of information for that site
may succeed because users require information in order to post on a social
network site. They need something to talk about.
Users may be one direct source of information when they draw on their
experiences as source material. In addition to users, the news media is a
source of information with fairly strong ties to social networks, not only
providing information users could link back to a privacy claimant like Giggs
but also encouraging the dissemination of that information through social
networks via links in each story. In his case it may even be that members of
the media intentionally released information they knew was granted legal
protection by the court or, at the very least, encouraged others to knowingly
disseminate that information across their personal networks.179 When
Thomas came forward with her story, the media acquired a measure of
control over the release of that information. Before that story could be
published, the claimant obtained an injunction meant to protect his identity,
but elements within the news media apparently made deliberate attempts to
leak it anyway. The essential point is that media control and dissemination
of private information were precursors to the wide-scale privacy breach that
occurred via Twitter. Viewed in this way the CTB debacle can be
characterized as another blow in an ongoing struggle between the U.K.’s
judiciary and the news media over the true implications of the HRA.
Therefore, Parliament may not need to overly concern itself with Twitter.
The question shifts from determining whether parliamentarians can regulate
Twitter or Twitter users directly, to whether they can effectively regulate the
news media in its capacity as an information source for social network sites.
To properly address that question, Parliament must take legislative action to
clarify the balance between the competing rights of Article 8 privacy and
Article 10 free expression.180
B. Balancing in Favor of a Free Press
Begin with the easiest argument: to solve the looming privacy issues,
Parliament should “beef up the press watchdog.”181 It could do so by
providing sweeping definitions for “public figures” and the “public interest”
179
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that would encompass celebrities and celebrity lifestyles. This may seem too
simplistic at first, but recall that according to ECHR Article 8 the
individual’s right to privacy only governs to the extent that the information is
not deemed “necessary . . .[to] the interests of national security, public safety
or . . . for the protection of health and morals . . . .”182 This concept was
referred to previously as the public interest exception to Article 8.183 Thus, if
celebrity affairs or lifestyles in general were swept into the definition of the
public interest, then celebrities would have no reasonable expectation of
privacy and thus no right to Article 8 protection regarding whatever matter
has been brought to light.184 At the very least, a rash of potential superinjunction cases and appeals could be avoided by allowing the media to
report on matters that have become so prevalent on social network sites that
they are well known anyway. Although this seems like a fair outcome on its
face, it relies on two invalid assumptions: (1) social network sites have little
discernible effect on the balance of ECHR rights, and (2) to the degree social
network sites may affect the balance of rights, free expression, and thus the
news media, are somehow the ones most harmed.
That the existence of social network sites affects the balance of privacy
and free expression cannot be denied. They are a form of media not
anticipated by the system proposed in the ECHR, which was created in 1950
(well before the rise of social network sites), and adopted by the HRA.185
Though the balance of rights was intended to inure in the favor of free
expression, as evidenced by reference to the weighted balancing test,186 the
rise of social network sites gives free expression a technical advantage over
the privacy right. The advantage flows from the speed of information
dissemination that results from a network structure and from the near
impossibility of determining what a given user is going to post from moment
to moment. It is inherently difficult for individuals to hold onto private
matters known by individuals with network access because each individual is
able to spread that information widely.
The second false assumption is that the news media are innocent victims
of the seemingly unstoppable growth of the social network site, a perception
reinforced by NGN’s appeal following the release of Giggs’s identity via
Twitter. Though the social network site may discourage reliance on printed
news, it is not an entirely separate form of media encroaching on the
182
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hallowed grounds of the press. As noted earlier, news sites provide links to
multiple social network sites within a given story, practically begging readers
to re-post information and disseminate it to their network of contacts.187 In
this sense social network sites act as extensions of the news media, providing
valuable advertisement and drawing in a larger audience.
Finally, although it is futile to guess whether any were aware of the full
impact that Twitter would have on the events following the CTB injunction,
evidence of so-called jigsaw identification and other journalistic practices
suggest that at least some within the news media were complicit in the
breach of privacy injunctions. Justice Eady acknowledged this likelihood in
the first appeal when commenting on the widespread attempts to render the
injunction ineffective.188 Thus, the existence of social networks conceivably
gives the free expression right an unanticipated advantage over the individual
privacy right far in excess of what was intended by lawmakers.
Strengthening the press’s investigative power would create a further
imbalance between the rights in Articles 8 and 10 by granting freedom of
expression a level of power that is not within the spirit of the ECHR. If the
U.K. wishes to uphold the standards that it adopted when the HRA was
signed into law, it must legislate with an eye to rebalancing the system in
favor of privacy rights.
C. Rebalance: Salvaging the Right of Privacy
The course of action that seems to most conform to ECHR standards is
for Parliament to provide for stronger regulation of the press. By better
controlling the sources from which social network users obtain information,
legislators may be able to limit access to some private information thus
alleviating certain forms of privacy infractions, particularly those similar to
what Giggs experienced. One way to better regulate the press would be for
Parliament to alter the definition of “public figure” to directly exclude
celebrities and their lives while leaving the “public interest” definition
unaltered. This would mean that as a matter of law the press could not report
a story merely because one or more of the subjects have celebrity status.
This is not, however, a complete bar on reporting celebrity stories.
Preserving the definition of public interest would permit the press to report
matters in which the celebrity was clearly acting in a manner influencing the
operation of democratic society. However, the onus would be on journalists
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to preliminarily ensure either newsworthiness or a privacy waiver by the
subject.
Legislative models excluding celebrity status from the public interest are
not new to European nations; Sweden relies on a self-regulatory agency
called the Swedish Press Council to police news articles and ensure that
individual privacy protection standards are met.189 According to members of
the Swedish press, the industry, not the legislators, defines public figure
narrowly to exclude celebrities altogether.190 Thus, in Sweden’s case there is
no legislation on the books requiring a narrow definition. For the U.K. press,
this would mean that stories regarding celebrities should be excluded from
reports unless the individuals involved consented or unless the subject matter
itself is clearly in public interest, such as criminal activity or acts
substantially similar in effect to those performed by public figures.191
Waiver is not limited to consent. It also includes actions by a celebrity that
directly place the subject matter into the public domain.192 One example
would be if a celebrity personally posted subject matter on a social network
site prior to seeking injunction.
Clearly writing celebrities out of public figure status, as considered under
the ECHR, should appropriately restore the Article 8 privacy right to its
position in the human rights balance. It would permit infringement of a
reasonable expectation of privacy only when the proper function of
democratic society is significantly influenced by that private information.193
Affairs and other private details of a celebrity’s life would have much the
same protections as the private matters of an average citizen.
Some might contend that, by injecting themselves into stardom,
celebrities should know they are watched by many and thus should not
expect the same level of privacy as average citizens. That is true, but in a
variation on Justice Tugendhat’s reasoning we might say the very fact that
celebrities have less privacy suggests that those matters that can remain
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private without hindering their work or the nation should be zealously
protected.194 However, a question still remains as to exactly how much
regulatory action Parliament must take to facilitate this rebalancing.
The Swedish self-regulatory system suggests that the press is capable of
handling itself. The Swedish Press Council has broad power to levy fines
and other forms of punishment for a violation of its standards.195 Perhaps
Parliament need only establish a press agency with sufficient power to
regulate and punish its own. Self-regulation would be the least invasive, and
likely the least stressful, action Parliament could take. However, it has
already been attempted.
The U.K.’s Press Complaints Commission (PCC) was formed in the early
1990s to replace the then existent self-regulatory body, the Press Council.196
The PCC lacks the enforcement powers available to the Swedish Press
Council (SPC) as well as many of the protections afforded to journalists
under SPC; the result appears to be that the PCC has used much of its
influence to avoid further press regulation, rather than to uphold individual
privacy.197 It certainly did little of import during the CTB debacle.
Therefore, Parliament will likely have to take a direct role in defining the
acceptable standards of press reports and should, at the very least, proceed to
adjust the scope of the public interest exception to clearly exclude celebrities
from the definition of public figures. Parliament can delegate some
responsibility to the PCC or to another regulatory agency that is
representative of journalists and the news industry, but that delegation must
include a grant of enforcement power sufficient for the agency to act
independently. There is one concern that would be relieved whether
Parliament chooses to take a more active role in regulation or to sanction a
fully self-regulatory scheme: judicial law making.
One of the key concerns with the HRA and judicial interpretation of the
ECHR was a fear that the judicial branch would usurp parliamentary
functions by crafting and enforcing a new privacy law without parliamentary
consent.198 If Parliament moves to strengthen privacy protection or charges
the media to do so, the specter of a rogue judiciary would have less cause to
haunt the public mind. Given the prior record of press self-regulation in the
U.K., however, Parliament likely needs to exercise a greater degree of
oversight than is present in the Swedish model until such time as the press
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industry demonstrates the ability to monitor and enforce compliance on its
own.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the words “privacy,” “regulation,” and “social network” are used in
such close proximity, they may conjure images of cybernetic beings
proclaiming the ultimate futility of resistance—at least for those stricken by
the science fiction bug. Regulators have a daunting task whenever
confronted by social network problems, thus Chairman Whittingdale’s
concerns do bear merit. The suggestion that better regulation of the news
media may be a solution to the privacy ills of some celebrities opens the door
to an indirect method of dealing with some social network privacy issues.
By managing the sources that supply social-network-site users with
information, Parliament may be able to reduce the instances of privacy
violation and the caseload stemming from such violations. An alternative to
increased stricture on the news media is to actually increase their
investigative powers, thereby cutting off the legal basis for complaints. But
in the U.K. and other state parties to the ECHR, this option conforms
significantly less to the principles of the Convention, turning what was meant
to be a balance of individual and public rights into a one-sided media affair.

